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England began lockdown 2.0 on the 5th November. Much has been learned since September when lockdown 2.0 would have saved a lot of lives. Starting on the 5th of November it came rather late in the day and even before it has ended, it is quite clear that lockdown 3.0 should be expected. This note is based on analysis of public data. Interventions definitely work. The problem is doing the right thing at the right time.

Many parts of the world have experienced a period when infection status testing became reliable and meaningful. However, the expected success of the much awaited vaccines, now about to be approved, will inevitably create testing uncertainty, provide greater opportunities for false claims and create new costs for liability insurers. Regulators should consider making a requirement for double testing. This would not only protect citizens from unwarranted restrictions of personal freedom and associated costs but would create reasonable certainty of facts at common law. A Limitation period of three years will create ample opportunities for claims supported by doubtful evidence.

The report provides a full account of addiction analysed against the standard headings used by the common law: breach of duty, foreseeability, causation, proximity, indemnity etc. On this basis, new addictants such as caffeine and sugar are assessed. The report sells for £550 plus VAT where applicable. write to andrew@reliabilityoxford.co.uk for further details. Picture sources: By Pauk https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/66/Cannabis_sativa2.jpg By Romain Behar – Own work, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1219848 By Julius Schorzman – Own work, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=107645 Website privacy policy This website is operated by Re: Liability (Oxford) Ltd. We take your privacy very seriously therefore we urge to read this policy very carefully because it contains important information about on: who we are, how and why we collect, store, use and share personal information, your rights in relation to

Addiction is not new. Drug trade wars have been fought. Legislation passed. Empires funded. Social ills disguised, profits made, careers progressed, lawyers enriched, jails filled, politicians acclaimed, lives ruined. Fundamental to addiction is that humans are strongly adapted to both habit formation and habit reinforcement. Whether these be physical habits such as how to walk or kick a football, social habits such as preferring to speak with people who have the same interests, cognitive biases such as selecting evidence which supports our view, or political biases such as liberalism or conservatism. These are all, to some extent, habits. Addictive behaviour is indicative of particularly strong habit reinforcement. Addiction is built upon our neurological habit-forming processes, our desire for pleasure, our capacity to prefer perverse arguments, our need for social conformity (or the reverse), and highly unpleasant withdrawal effects, lest we forget. Understandably, given the machine

A liability, science and media briefing based on consideration of the recent high profile research publication, reference: N Engl J Med (2019) Vol. 381 p 1801-1808. Daniel F. Mackay et al.Neurodegenerative Disease Mortality among Former Professional Soccer Players Summary Aims. Science research and popular narratives both have influence with the decider-of-fact at common law. It follows that both have an influence on liability exposure. This report has two main aims: 1) To present a brief analysis of the science research report (referenced above). 2) To report and assess the popular themes chosen by the press in response to the publication of this research in Nov 2019. Emerging liability risk. If some aspect of football playing was found to be causal of neurodegenerative disease (NDD) then similar scenarios could expose a range of liability insurance policies. Scenarios could include school sports, amateur sports, other professional sports and some occupations. In the UK, severe dement

IARC on Glyphosate – what to do when a mistake is made? The Governing Council of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC[1]) is meeting[2] today and tomorrow. Not listed on the published agenda is glyphosate, but much of the conversation will be about the hotly disputed decision[3] that glyphosate is ‘probably carcinogenic to humans’ (Group 2A). Was it the right finding, why was so much of the animal experimentation evidence deemed unsuitable for consideration, is it ethical to make pronouncements of any sort if there is no published evidence of how often IARC decisions are wrong? How should scientific expert opinion be held to account? Who underwrites the effect of mistakes? Is it ethical not to take responsibility for mistakes? Holding IARC to account It seems obvious in hindsight that institutions of all kinds whether commercial or public should publish an account of how accurate their published findings are[4]. In time, false positives, false negatives, true positives